Ellsberg is a pioneer of behavioural science and more especially behavioural economics, being one of the first to use experiments to demonstrate deviations from expected utility theory.

His legacy in the wider-world stems from his decision to blow the whistle on unofficial US policy in the run up to and during the Vietnam war. Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, which were published verbatim in the New York Times and Washington Post throughout the month of June 1971. The papers document that the Johnson administration lied to congress about US military actions.

Ellsberg’s personal sacrifices were substantial:

• He invested enormous efforts in getting the contents of papers to the public in a responsible way. Malcolm Gladwell draws an interesting contrast between how responsible Ellsberg was compared to Edward Snowden, who dropped a famous data dump in 2013. Initally Ellsberg approached US senators with his findings. Only when they refused to act did he go to the press.
• Ellsberg admitted to being the source of the Pentagon papers, which naturally ended his promising career in military intelligence.
• At a very perfunctory level, he sacrificed night after night to copy page after page of material. In total he copied over 4,000 pages by hand in the basement of the RAND corporation, even when doing so required him to bring his children along.
• Something he probably did not anticipate is that Richard Nixon, US president at the time, would make him a personal enemy. In an act that would presage the Watergate fiasco, the Nixon adminstration commissioned a burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office with a view to finding information in Ellsberg’s patient files that would discredit him.

From Paul Slovic:

Daniel Ellsberg, a great American hero, died on June 16 at age 92. He is well known to the decision-making community for his work on risk and ambiguity that became famous as the Ellsberg Paradox. He is well known to the world for his role in copying and distributing The Pentagon Papers, exposing the American government’s deceitful communications about the Vietnam War, helping to bring this bloody conflict to an end.  I met him at one of Ward Edwards’ Bayesian Conferences in Ann Arbor, and he stayed in touch over these many years. In recent years we had good conversations around the implications of psychic numbing for enabling genocide and nuclear war. To his last days, he was attentive to current events and passionate in his quest for making the world more peaceful and just. His long-time assistant sent me this list of his early papers relating to decision making that I’d like to share with you.
Paul Slovic
Early Papers by Daniel Ellsberg, 1954-1963

Decision Theory

1.  “Classic & Current Notions of Measurable Utility <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_classic__current_notions_of_measurable_utility_the_economic_journal_london_september_1954/>,” The Economic Journal – London, 1954, Vol. LXIV, pp. 528-556

2.  “Presidents as Perfect Detonators <http://de_notes_papers_art_of_coercion_presidents_as_perfect_detonators_march_1959/>,” (Art of Coercion), one of the Lowell Lectures on The Art of Coercion: A Study of Threats in Economic Conflict and War, Lowell Institute, Boston, 1959

3.  “Risk, Ambiguity, & the Savage Axioms <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_risk_ambiguity__the_savage_axioms_reprinted_from_quarterly_journal_of_economics_vol_lxxv_november_1961/>,” reprinted November 1961, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXV, 1961, pp. 644-661.

4.  “The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_the_crude_analysis_of_strategic_choices_in_condensed__published_format_12_15_60/>,” condensed & published format, 12/15/60

5.  “The Political Uses of Madness <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_art_of_coercion_the_political_uses_of_madness_lowell_lecture_one_34_pages_1959/>” (Art of Coercion), one of the Lowell Lectures on The Art of Coercion: A Study of Threats in Economic Conflict and War, Lowell Institute, Boston, 1959

6.  “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_art_of_coercion_the_theory__practice_of_blackmail_3_10_59/>” (Art of Coercion), one of the Lowell Lectures on The Art of Coercion: A Study of Threats in Economic Conflict and War, Lowell Institute, Boston, 1959

7.  “Theory of the Reluctant Dualist <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_theory_of_reluctant_dualist_american_economic_review_dec_1956/>,” American Economic Review, Vol. XLVI, December 1956, pp. 909-923. Reprinted in Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, ed. Oran R. Young, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1975.

8.  “Vagueness & Decision – A Rejoinder <https://www.ellsberg.net/de_notes_papers_vagueness__decision_a_rejoinder_version_two_february_1963/>,” pre-publication version, for Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1963